1.
Respecting People: The modesty of theory
Prof. Green sensitively delineates the contours not only of my views on respect, but of the way they fit in the general approach to practical thought that I endorsed. He also points to various problems to which the approach gives rise, or as I would prefer to put it, which this approach leaves unresolved. As I would plead guilty to most of the charges it is useful to start with a few words about the general outlook that informed my writings on respect. They will explain why I doubt the possibility of meeting, at the high level of generality found in general accounts of respect, the charges Green raises.
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In particular I avoided any questions of minor misrepresentations of my views.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1556437
It is common for writers on topics in practical philosophy to seize on terms which figure prominently in ethical, political or legal discourse outside the academy, assign them explanations, and give them key roles in the theoretical accounts or practical principles that those writers develop. My writings on respect are a case in point. In doing so we signal an intention both to relate to a theoretical debate about respect, as it developed over the years, and to explain something of importance in practical thought in the culture in which the use of the term is prominent. One difficulty we invariably encounter is that both the philosophical tradition and the culture at large contain diverse, and partially inconsistent, strands of thought. In using 'respect' to name a special type of practical reasons I was suggesting that invocations of respect for persons in moral thought (outside the academy), or many of them, can be explained as appealing to reasons of that type. I was also implicitly endorsing some, and rejecting other, parts of the philosophical writings on the subject. All that would have been plain enough had not the use of the term in and out of philosophy been so diverse and complex that it would be absurd for me to claim that other explications of it are necessarily misguided or wrong. I make no such claim, no claim beyond saying that the account I offered can shed light both on practical reasons and on ideas about respect for persons current in our culture.
In writing on respect I had some specific aims, most importantly to separate the case for the value of people from questions about the value of their life. There usually are additional reasons to respect people deriving from other valuable qualities they or their life possess. Needless to say, (it is likely that) only the reasons to respect persons as persons apply equally to all persons.
do not trump all others. This does not mean that there is no duty to respect persons. It means that respect spills over, in the way that Green explains, and that not every manifestation of respect is supported by a particularly powerful reason. There is in some quarters a tendency to take any invocation of reasons of respect as a winner in any argument, and often as an occasion for banging the It is worth underlining another point on which Green and I agree, namely that the fact that people can recognise and cherish respect shown to them, and resent its absence, adds to the complexity of the issues, in no small measure because it introduces symbolic manifestations of respect, which are necessarily conventional at least in part, and therefore contingent on current practices, and those may and do differ across communities, including those inhabiting the same country.
While agreeing with Green's substantive comments on the difficulties of determining what to do on specific occasions, I do not share his worries about the shortcomings of my or other theoretical writings in this regard. Green says that such cases 'reflect the ways in which theories of value, pitched at their most abstract, are insufficiently specified to tell us much about what is required in the situations that provoke us to wonder about respect in the first place ' (20 here is probably based either on a desire for theoretically provided decision procedures, or possibly on the thought that reasons of respect must trump others, and leave no room for the influence of personal attachments which I discuss earlier in that book.
A word about duties will help to clarify the picture. Green correctly states my explanation of the concept. It was, however, always meant in the spirit of my observations above about explanations of respect and other practical concepts in common use. 'Duties' is a particularly elusive concept in practical discourse today.
Perhaps because of the tendency to rights-inflation, typical of a complaint culture, it often appears as if people take all moral reasons to constitute duties. It is doubtful that the term can be given an interesting theoretical explanation that will be even approximately faithful to its role in current moral discourse. In any case, and this is my fault, in VALUE, RESPECT AND ATTACHMENT the term is used loosely (the book consists of lectures addressed to a non-specialist audience). One thought I had, though probably failed to express adequately, is that not all reasons of respect constitute duties. 5 We have reason to make it more likely that people will engage with value, and that provides us with facilitative reasons to preserve objects of value. But clearly these reasons are often not very stringent. Green is quite right to point that out, and to point out that we tend to think that reasons of respect are more important, and have greater stringency than these considerations would suggest.
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I should also mention that while Green distinguishes '(1) If one φ-s in regard to A, then one has a duty to φ respectfully' from '(2) One has a duty to φ in regard to A, because φ-ing is a way of respecting A', I regard (1) as a special case of (2). My view that one need not think of certain objects of value at all, but should have attitudes appropriate to their value if one is aware of them, does not conflict with the fact that in order to meet our obligations (still using the term loosely) to others we have to make ourselves aware of relevant conditions. The expression of attitudes is generally partially conventional, and therefore contingent.
Respect is no exception. But some ways of expressing respect appear to be pretty universal. So far as I know it is pretty universal that care and respect are expressed in protecting and preserving, while disrespect is expressed in indifference to preservation, or even a desire to destroy. The fact that these are natural expressions of respect, and that they are universally understood so, is at least part of the case for regarding such behaviour as constituting openness. And similar considerations show that recognition of value, and the attitudes that are apt towards objects of value, also constitute openness.
These thoughts and attitudes will be expressed with the sentence 'that object has value' only by people whose affective and intellectual lives are abstract and impoverished.
Normally they will be any of the myriad of thoughts suitable to the occasion and the object, which can be described as recognition of value, but are had by people who may A fact which should be understood in a ways which allow for the complexities of human psychology, in which reversals or normal meaning, as when one does something that normally expresses rejection of another in order to express hurt, betraying one's attachment to that other. The normal always opens the possibilities of variations and reversals. Some people believe that 'deserve' (in 'deserve respect) is used 'loosely' or in a different sense than 'deserve' in 'deserve to be rewarded for their efforts' or in some such context. Also, some may feel that the respect due to people qua people is different respect than that due to, say, great composers qua great composers. I share neither of these views. The grounds of, respectively, desert and respect in these examples differ, and the respect may well have to be manifested (partly) in different ways. But the words are used in the same sense in all these contexts, and express the same concepts.
by the degree to which other faculties are developed. The respect due to them is among the foundations of morality.
From Respect to (Limited) Neutrality?
I share the approach that informs Prof. Wall's article as well as most of his conclusions.
Perhaps there is no practical question on which his views bear, regarding which we would differ. But there is nevertheless a certain difference that I would like to record.
But first I need to set the scene, and indicate our agreement.
Prof. Wall agrees that the various doctrines of state neutrality advanced so far are open to serious criticism and should be rejected. He articulates one such principle, closely modelled on Rawls's view:
It is impermissible for the state to intend to favor or promote any permissible ideal of a good human life over any other permissible ideal of a good human life, or to give greater assistance to those who pursue it.
A permissible ideal of a good human life, for the purposes of this principle, is an ideal of a good human life that is consistent with the requirements of justice for a modern democratic society, where the requirements of justice are not themselves founded on or tied to any particular ideal of a good human life.' (9) He does however recommend a restricted neutrality principle:
'(RNP): If two or more ideals of a good human life are eligible for those who live in a particular political society, and if these ideals have adherents in that political society, and if these ideals cannot be ranked by reason as better or worse than one another, then the state, to the extent that it aims to promote the good in this political society, should be neutral between these ideals in its support of them.' (8) It is not clear how restrictive is the qualification 'to the extent that it aims to promote the good in this political society'. Possibly the qualification does not restrict a perfectionist government at all, for by definition the ideals of which it speaks are neither better nor worse than each other, and therefore promoting one at the expense of the other will not promote the good in that society. 8 Some people may think that the good is promoted if more people come to pursue one of these ideals, and are diverted away from ineligible or unworthy ones. We may suppose that they could be attracted to one 8 (RNP) does apply to cases in which the state proposes action in order to promote the good because it mistakes the situation, not realising that the case is of a choice between options none of which is superior to any of the others. But we do not need principles to direct states not to act on mistakes. Besides, to know that (PRN) applies one must realise that the case is of a choice among options not none of which are better than any of the others, and therefore it can be applied correctly only if one is not mistaken.
worthwhile and eligible ideal but not to others. So according to those people by preferring that ideal over others the state would be promoting the good. If this is the case then RNP has this practical implication: it excludes promoting the good for this reason or in this way. It excludes consideration of the number of people who follow or are likely to come to follow one or another ideal principle. Other people would deny that the good is advanced if more people pursue good and eligible ideals -their good is advanced but not the good in some general sense. But then, I hope that in writing about 'promoting the good' Prof. Wall meant nothing more than making it more likely that people will have a good life, or as I would prefer to put it: enabling people to have a good life. 9 Practically speaking it does not matter which view Prof. Wall takes on this point as he makes clear (p. 18) that he recognises that numbers count, and concludes that RNP does not apply in cases similar to the one I mentioned, or in some others where the number of followers of different good and eligible ideals is not equal.
But then we are back with the possibility that RNP is not really a principle because it makes no difference. In the circumstances to which it applies there is no possibility of acting 'to promote the good'. Prof. Wall's aim in putting forward the principle seems to be to stop 'arbitrary' action which favours some worthwhile and eligible ideal over others. But such favouring by being arbitrary is declared not 'to promote the good'.
Hence the principle does not actually forbid such actions. This seems to be a technical point calling for a technical modification of the principle. But I will not offer such a modification, not being sure how Prof. Wall would want to proceed at this point. I will rather assume that an appropriate modification has been put in place.
I hope it is not unfair to summarise Prof. Wall's view as saying that the guide to political action is sound aggregation. When all other considerations have been given their due significance, and the only issue remaining is the allocation of support among eligible ideals which will affect only goods with which people's self-worth is associated, then numbers will not count, for favouring one such ideal over others will adversely affect people's sense of their own merited self-worth. RNP kicks in and governs the allocation in such cases. Since it applies to all state actions all we need, to know that it applies, is that the action under consideration be a state action. RNP is not like that. To know that it applies we need to examine all the reasons which apply to the action under consideration, and if we conclude that in the circumstances (a) reasons of self-respect dominate, and (b) that favouring one ideal over others would undermine it, then we know that it applies, though -of course -by that time we no longer need to apply it. We have already established what to do.
The preceding statement exaggerates the case to make it more dramatic, and to save us from the caveats that an accurate statement would require. But the point is sound. It is not that the principle is false, but that it is not the sort of thing that normally we identify as a principle. Two additional points are important in explaining this reaction. First, reasons of self-respect do apply in other contexts as well, i.e. they apply in contexts in which they do not dominate, and where the right action is either one that ignores them, or one that is a compromise between them and other considerations. Second, even when they dominate it is not always the case that favouring one eligible and worthwhile ideal over others undermines the self-respect of those whose ideal is disfavoured. As Prof. Wall makes clear we are dealing here with symbolic actions, and their meanings depend on the common views of people in that country, especially the views of those who follow the relevant ideal. Those people may, they often do, discriminate between various ways of favouring ideals, and do not regard all of them as offensive to followers of the non-favoured ones. I suppose that my conclusion is that I agree with Prof. Wall's views, and find them a valuable addition to the writings on these topics. But I think that in wrapping up his views in the form of a principle of neutrality he expresses not so much a sound moral outlook as a desire to find common ground with the misguided advocates of neutrality principles, a desire which I do not share.
Darwall on Rights and Duties
The reasons Professors Green, Wall and I discussed would normally be classified as moral reasons. None of us drew attention to this fact as we were concerned not with 'I call these reasons second-personal to highlight this relation to address, which is necessarily always to someone (an addressee) and so in that sense second-personal, even when the addressee is oneself, the public at large, or anyone at all, real or imagined. ' (1) Since the addressee can be oneself, the public at large or some imagined person, I think that the term 'second-personal' is misleading, suggesting that there is a real person who is second to the person addressing him, that is who is not identical with him. I will 12 I have argued in more detail for the theoretical unimportance of the classification of reasons into moral and others in chapters eleven and twelve of ENGAGING REASONS (OUP 1999) therefore avoid the term when I can conveniently do so, referring instead to duties and rights, etc. Of course, the choice of terminology does not affect the argument. 'The objection to my irreducible claim would then proceed as follows. If the reasons with which an agent would better comply were not themselves second-personal reasons, it would then follow that someone could acquire practical authority over her owing entirely to nonsecond-personal considerations. So there might be good arguments to second-personal claims (e.g., A's authority over B and consequently A's authoritative demands of B) that do not depend on premises in which second-personal concepts and reasons figure in any way.'
My explanation of authority is an attempt to explain authority over people of the kind that governments claim to have over their subjects, parents over their children, etc. It ideas about those reasons to explain more than rights and duties. I will address their application to the explanation of rights and duties only. It will be evident, however, that there is reason to think that if they fail in that task they fail altogether. To simplify I will, as Darwall does, use 'duties' and 'obligations' interchangeably, and will not consider duties which are not meant to protect rights. The questions to be raised apply to them too, but it simplifies the exposition to ignore them.
It is common ground to both of us, as well as to most others who have written about rights, that when there are rights that have corresponding duties (and I think that like me, Darwall thinks that all rights have corresponding duties) then those duties are duties that are in some sense owed to the right-holder. The targets of explanation are primarily these notions, that is what is the difference between a duty and practical reasons which are not duties, and what is it for a duty to be owed to a particular person. As I mentioned (in section one above) I tend to think that in contemporary usage 'duty' does not signify a normatively distinctive category, other than the fact that only categorical reasons, i.e. ones whose application is not conditional on the agent's inclinations or preferences etc., can give rise to duties. In institutional contexts, where talk of duty is particularly at home, they indicate categorical protected reasons, and outside such contexts the term is used when the reasons are of some importance. I have a more definite view of when duties are owed to a person, which is when their justification turns on the fact that they protect or promote an interest of the person to whom they are owed, and this also means that that person has a right, a right which is protected by these duties. 13 The fact that duties that protect rights are justified by reference to the interest of the right-holder has a variety of important implications, mostly ones which depend on further circumstances, and therefore do not necessarily apply to all rights. For example, many rights can be transferred by the right-holder, thus changing the person to whom the duties attached to the right are owed. That is a result of the fact that often the interest of the right-holder is precisely in having the power to transfer a right, by way of gift, or sale, or to transfer some subsidiary rights, as when people lend or lease property. Even when this is not the main interest of the rightholder in the right, it may be an implication of the justifying interest which the right and its attendant duties protect that an aspect of the right is the power of the right-holder to forego respect for it on occasion, or just waive it permanently. A right that is not in 'Suppose, however, that you take yourself to have a right (specifically, a "claim right") not to be caused gratuitous pain. Were you to think that, I take it, you would have also to think that you have as a right holder some standing or authority to claim or demand that people not step on your feet without your consent and, specifically, that the person currently stepping on your foot not have done so, that he get off, and so on … Moreover, …you must also think that you have some standing, again as the right holder, to hold the person accountable for having stepped on your feet, for example, to object, to ask him his reasons, to demand an apology, to forgive him if he apologizes, and so on. Since the idea of a right is connected in this way to the (right holder's) authority to claim or demand and hold accountable, it is a second-personal reason. ' (6) What kind of authority does he have in mind here? 'Authority' is a word rich in subtle and nuanced meanings 14 , not all relevant here. But two are. One is the concept used when saying that one has authority to enter a restricted area, or to read one's employer's appointment book. Here 'having authority to Φ' means being permitted to Φ. Note that being permitted to Φ is not the same as it being OK to Φ. I may scratch my nose, but I do not need permission to scratch my nose, nor is there anyone who can, who has the authority, to permit me to scratch my nose. Permission implies an exception to a general prohibition, and normally, though not always, someone who has authority in the second sense, to prohibit and to exempt from the prohibition. This second sense is authority as the power to impose duties on others simply by expressing an intention to do so.
My account of authority that Darwall criticises is of that second concept of authority. raised early in a process it may be too late to raise it later. In particular, a court's decision given in an action that the plaintiff had no standing to initiate is unlikely to be void, and often not even voidable, on that ground. So perhaps legal standing is a permission to initiate a legal process, which is not invalidated if it is initiated without it.
Whatever we think of legal standing, and possibly there are different kinds of legal standing, outside the law it is hard to apply the term to any normative power since there are no formalised processes which one initiates relying on the standing. One is simply engaging in an act of communication. Such an act can be improper, meriting the response: 'this is none of your business' or 'mind your own business', and that suggests that when it is proper it is a permission, a permission to intrude into the affairs of another. Normally we should not do so, but sometimes we have standing, i.e. a permission to do so.
It is possible that I am relying on too narrow a range of concepts, thus missing some of the richness of the idea of standing. But there is also a theoretical advantage in explaining the rich range of normative phenomena as variations on some basic types. It makes it easier to understand the inter-relations of the phenomena. And absent a more concrete objection or alternative I will proceed on the assumption that 'standing' refers to a permission, and consequently that the authority Darwall's account repeatedly refers to is a permission.
According to Darwall when someone, call her Abigail, is under an obligation to Φ others are permitted to act towards her in ways they are not permitted to behave towards people generally, not even towards people who have reason to Φ which is not a duty to Φ. People are permitted to demand or to claim performance of the duty, and if Abigail is in breach of her duty they are permitted to require that she should compensate, or apologise, etc. Clearly, however, there is more to a duty to Φ than a reason to Φ coupled with others being permitted to demand compliance or compensation or apology for breach. Presumably there is some connection between the reason and the permission and that connection is crucial to the existence of the duty. Darwall marks the connection by saying that the person under the duty, Abigail in our example, is responsible or accountable to others.
Given the many senses in which 'responsibility' is used, it may help avoid confusion if we focus on the idea of accountability, which is more specific. Who is Abigail accountable to regarding her duty to Φ? It turns out that according to Darwall she is doubly accountable. She is accountable to all members of the moral community, and she is accountable in an additional way to the person whose right her duty is a duty to respect, whose right will be violated if she will not Φ. Let me give him too a name for ease of reference: Let him be Abe. In explaining the two aspects of accountability Darwall suddenly turns to an observation about moral emotions:
'Although the victim of wrongdoing has the distinctive standing to resent or forgive an injury, he has no special standing others do not have to blame the wrongdoer or to hold him responsible through … reactive attitudes such as indignation. 15 This is an authority that anyone has as a representative of the moral community, indeed, that the wrongdoer has himself and that he exercises when, in blaming himself, he feels guilt.' (7)
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Though it is not distinctively up to the victim whether to have the attitude of blame, the victim may have a distinctive standing to blame the wrongdoer overtly. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for prompting me to clarify this point.
It is clear, however, that he does not think that the special accountability Abigail owes
Abe consists of which emotions would be appropriate for her to feel. He says that 'Both involve an authority to make claims and demands and to hold accountable, although in different ways.' (7) 16 I will return to the special standing of Abe, the right-holder, below.
But first we can dismiss, I think, the thought that duties are marked by special accountability to people as representatives of a moral community, and that because of the accumulated force of several considerations.
First, everyone who is subject to practical reasons at all, every rational agent, is a member of the moral community. There is no indication to the contrary in Darwall, and none would be morally acceptable.
Second, while Darwall sometimes refers to people as taking up a second-person standpoint, that seems to consist in nothing more than saying that the speaker or someone else has a right or a duty. There is no separate action, or thought, which constitutes the taking up of that alleged standpoint. As a result the very idea that there is a separate standpoint involved is not given any meaning.
Third, and similarly, since whenever we talk to people about their rights and obligations we act as 'representatives' of the moral community, there is no specific meaning to the idea of being such a representative. We need not feel, believe, or express in any way the thought that we act as such representatives, nor can we stop being such representatives simply by denying that we are, as I am here doing. So, it is not clear that the idea has any distinct content, and since there is nothing to being a member of the community other than being a rational agent, a condition quite distinct from membership of any community we may think of, there does not seem to be much meaning to the idea of a moral community in the first place.
Fourth and finally, it is neither true that we are permitted to address others, even complete strangers, about their conduct only when duties are involved, nor that we are always permitted to address others, even strangers, about their conduct when duties are involved. No special standing or authority is required by one to form beliefs about 16 The context of the observation is very obscure, referring as it does to a reason a right-holder has. Typically having a right involves a reason or duty others have towards the right-holder. Right-holders do not have reasons just in virtue of being right-holders. However, I believe that I do not distort Darwall when using the quotation as I do.
another's conduct, nor to have feelings or emotions in reaction to other people's conduct. Nor is it the case that people must suppress the natural expression of their emotions, which betray themselves in their facial expressions, tone of voice, etc. Finally, people do not require permission to express their opinions or feelings, including expressing them forcefully. It does not follow that it is always a good idea to do so.
Expressing opinions, offering advice, reproaching others (or oneself) and the like are acts which should be done for sufficient reasons only. But we may have such good reasons regarding people's conduct when no rights or duties are involved and may lack it when rights and duties are involved. It all depends on the circumstances, to coin a phrase. Similarly, what one says in exhortation or reproach and so on, should be modulated to the seriousness of the matter. But sometimes behaviour that does not involve breach of duty is more seriously reprehensible than one which does. It is true that some expressions of reproach, notably using words like 'it is my right', are specific to conduct affecting rights and duties. But that just goes to show that we should express ourselves truly and sensibly, given the subject matter we address. It does not show that there is a special permission unique to rights and duties.
We can illustrate this point with two examples. Darwall gives the example of someone who fails to prepare for his retirement as a case in which no duty is involved. What, however is inappropriate in people expressing strong disapproval of such behaviour, urging that person to change his ways and start saving for retirement and so on? Of course, normally only friends should do so. But there is no hard and fast rule about that.
If a few strangers fall into conversation while drinking in a bar, and the conversation turns to preparation for retirement, they may well reproach the one who did nothing to protect his future. Now turn to breach of obligations. A person who is rude to his young child is in breach of obligation, but 'mind your own business' would be an appropriate rebuke to reproaches from busybodies. This, you may rightly point out, is just my moral view. It is, but there is no reason to think that the disagreement about who may draw the attention of those who are subject to certain reasons for action to the existence of those reasons, and reproach them for non-compliance, is a dispute about whether those reasons are duties.
So far I have ignored the special position that a right-holder has regarding the duties that protect his rights. As I explained above, in my view these are primarily that the duties are justified by their service to the right-holder's interests, and secondarily by some of the consequences of this fact, such that in many cases the right-holder can waive the right, or some aspects of it. Darwall's explanation of the special standing of the right-holder in terms of a permission to demand performance of the duty, or compensation or apologies for its breach, fails. Even on his own account the permission extends to others as well. This applies to compensation and apology too. I can demand of Abigail that she compensate Abe and apologise to him, when she violates his rights.
That she owes an apology to him, or to him in particular (sometimes people can and do appropriately apologise to people other than the victim of their violations) is an acknowledgement that the duty derived from his interests, and therefore it was he who was let down by its violation. The duty to compensate is part of the "logic" of practical 
Darwall on The Normal Justification Thesis
The failure of Darwall's account of rights and obligations does not in the least vindicate my account of authority. Nor does it show that his criticism of it is with without merit.
He draws attention to some features of my account which others found problematic as well. It is, however, not easy to isolate the challenging points from others which seem to me less worthwhile. This is due in part to the fact that that my account of authority is I would agree with that. The argument is not that one has those derivative reasons stated in III because it would be good to believe in them. It is that it is good to believe in 21 This is fortunate as it means that the criticism is not undermined by the fact that he misrepresents the pre-emption thesis. He never states its content. The closest he comes is when he writes: 'The idea underlying Raz's preemption thesis is that in deciding what directives to issue, an authority will take account of first-order reasons, at least within some range, for and against actions that would be prescribed by directives the authority is considering and that an authoritative directive preempts the reasons for acting that the authority has already taken into account, specifically, it preempts or excludes the reasons for performing any action that would violate the directive'. (13) In fact the underlying idea is that a legitimate authority ought to consider certain reasons and that its directives pre-empt the reasons that it ought to have considered (though if the fact that it ignored some of them or got them so wrong deprives it of legitimacy then the thesis does not apply).
Similarly the fact that at times he misrepresents the nature of exclusionary reasons is -for the same reason -irrelevant to his argument. As he rightly points out exclusionary reasons are reasons not to act for certain reasons: 'as Raz usually defines the general category of "exclusionary reason," namely, as a second-order reason not to be moved by or to act for certain first-order reasons.' (17) It is therefore unfortunate that much of his discussion on pp.17-8 turns on the case for or against considering certain matters, which is irrelevant to the issue. he has in mind then up to a point we agree. That an authority is entitled to impose a duty to Φ does not entail that it is entitled to impose a sanction for failing to Φ, or a remedy should any right be violated thereby. One needs a separate argument for that, and the argument -on my account -would be provided if NJT would apply to those additional measures. It may not, even when it applies to the demand to Φ. In the case of the law we assume that the two go together, but when we think of the authority of voluntary associations we readily perceive the possibility of a gap between their authority to impose demands on their members and their authority to impose sanctions for violations of those demands, or remedies for their breach. The example of voluntary associations may provide an answer to the question: does it not follow that there is no authority without the double power -the power to demand an action, and the power to impose a sanction or demand a compensation for breach of the first demand? This
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Later on, referring to the wrong kind of reason argument, he writes: 'the fact that one has reason to adopt an attitude does not in general make it the case that the attitude is true, correct, or "fitting".' (15) That is of course true but, as explained in the text, irrelevant. double power theory of authority, a variant on my own account, is appealing, but in this radical form there seem to be persuasive counter examples. I am not, of course, suggesting that the double power view would quell Darwall's doubts. But some variants of it, yet to be formulated and explored, may appeal to those who do not share his own theory, and yet are inclined to question my account on this point.
Theoretical and practical authority
One of the failings of my explanation of the service conception was a failure to explore the way it relates to epistemic authority. Darwall's retirement example helps to bring the issue into focus. I agree with Darwall that his imagined expert has no practical authority over him. It is not entirely clear how this is meant to be a counter-example to my account. Perhaps this way: She tells him -'If you decide to invest in a pension fund invest in this and that fund'. I make the directive conditional in order to avoid the question whether she can be known to be an expert on whether Darwall should invest in a pension fund at all. To be an expert on that she needs much more than financial expertise. She needs extensive knowledge of Darwall's health, family, their health and finances, the type of life-style which would be good for him when old etc. Darwall, in setting out the example, assumes that her directives would be the directives one would
give if one knew all of that, and made no mistakes. However, that is not enough to endow her with authority over me. Darwall needs to be able to know that that is the case, and if she does not have good knowledge and understanding of all these matters he has no reason to think that her directives will be sound ones. This leads me to think that the explanation of Darwall's example is that the NJT is not met when the only reason to think that an authoritative instruction is correct is that it represents an expert view about what is good to do, a view which is not based on the fact that the expert will so instruct, or has so instructed. At least this is the case regarding people who can follow theoretical authorities. Small children and some mentally handicapped people may not have that ability, while being able to follow practical authorities. It does not follow that expertise is not relevant to practical authorities. It is, but only when it is mixed with other considerations, such as need for co-ordination, for concretising indeterminate boundaries, and the like.
